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Abstract 
Much attention has been paid to China’s determination to exert its influence over the East and 
South China seas using both political and military power. The final few weeks of 2013 saw a 
rapid deterioration of the diplomatic goodwill that China had built with its maritime neighbours 
over the past several decades, threatening regional stability and risking an arms race with the 
U.S., Japan, and Southeast Asia. This article draws on some snapshots of the latest sovereignty 
disputes in the East and South China seas and the bilateral ties across the Taiwan Strait to discuss 
the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world. It argues that 
the ability of China to pursue security interests in its maritime frontiers is largely contingent 
upon many circumstantial factors. 
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Introduction 
Much attention has been paid to China’s determination to exert its influence over the East 
and South China seas using both political and military power. The final few weeks of 2013 saw a 
rapid deterioration of the diplomatic goodwill that China had built with its maritime neighbours 
over the past several decades, threatening regional stability and risking an arms race with the 
U.S., Japan, and Southeast Asia. This attempt to challenge the U.S.-dominated global order 
clearly departed from former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s diplomatic principle of lying low 
and biding time (taoguang yanghui), aimed at normalizing relationships with the international 
community and diffusing worldwide concerns about China’s threat.1  
China today projects economic and political strength to rival that of the U.S. As a state-
managed economy employing gradualist reforms in a post-communist era, China distinguishes 
itself as a model of development for other developing countries to follow. Meanwhile, the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq committed American military power to two costly campaigns. 
The failure of Washington to denuclearize North Korea and Iran destroyed the perception of the 
U.S. as being able to control the arms race. Detecting a shift in the balance of power in China’s 
favour, the Communist leadership has advocated a global order built on multilateralism, and 
formed alliances with many developing countries.  
China under Hu Jintao marked itself by the concept of a peaceful rise (heping jueqi). 
Through leadership that was nonthreatening to its neighbours, China asserted that it had risen 
rather than stood up (qilai) in a geostrategic sense. This Chinese term for rise, jueqi, likewise 
contrasts with the perceived decline of the West. Harvard historian Niall Ferguson calls China an 
informal imperialist that exercises indirect power through economic dominance and military 
influence. 2  Hu’s vision revealed the new confidence of Chinese leaders to access energy 
resources, to reshape international institutions, and to compete with the U.S.3 The new President 
Xu Jinping has differentiated himself from Hu with a new slogan of the Chinese Dream 
(Zhongguo meng), expressing the desire to achieve national rejuvenation and global leadership.4  
This article draws on some snapshots of the latest sovereignty disputes in the East and 
South China seas and the bilateral ties across the Taiwan Strait to discuss the continuities and 
breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world. It argues that the ability of China 
to pursue security interests in its maritime frontiers is largely contingent upon many 
circumstantial factors, especially the negative attributes of globalization and the growth of 
domestic discontents.  
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Maritime Security in Southeast Asia 
The Chinese pursuit of maritime security in Southeast Asia is far more assertive than has 
been acknowledged in the media. After joining the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
in 1991, China used the forum to strengthen ties with maritime neighbours in order to undermine 
American regional influence. Seeing the U.S. trapped in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China 
appealed to Southeast Asia by endorsing multilateral structures, promoting free trade, and 
initiating security arrangements. In 2005, China encouraged the formation of the East Asian 
Community. Initially, China wanted to create a regional forum called “ASEAN plus Three” to 
improve trading relations between all ten member states of the Association for Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (i.e., Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the three East Asian countries of China, Japan, and South 
Korea. However, Japan and other states protested and pushed China to accept the ASEAN plus 
Six, a larger alliance composed of Southeast Asia, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, 
and New Zealand. The East Asian Community was designed to build a Chinese model of 
economic integration at the expense of the U.S. Taiwan was another major economy that was 
excluded, but Beijing offered Taiwanese merchants tax exemptions for exporting agricultural 
products to the Mainland. This development was reminiscent of the Chinese tributary system 
which had dominated the South China Sea before the age of Western imperialism. It remains 
unclear whether the current development would give rise to a China-centred economic union, 
and whether the Mainland market would lose its appeal in times of a financial slowdown.  
Besides economic ties, the Chinese model of top-down internet governance appeals to 
Southeast Asia. According to Sidney Y. Liu, many Southeast Asian leaders adhered to the 
Chinese vision of the cyberspace as both an economic frontier to exploit and a political space to 
restrain. They turned to China to duplicate a wide range of surveillance technologies. Vietnam 
developed an internet firewall similar to China’s Great Firewall to block sensitive online 
information, and Malaysia installed a Chinese-style Green Dam system. The security officials 
from Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar received training from China in internet control tactics. 
Meanwhile China doubled up the efforts to integrate all regional telecommunication networks. 
The most remarkable scheme was the Great Mekong Sub-region Information Superhighway, 
launched in 2004 to construct a unified telecom network from Southwest China to Myanmar, 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Composed of three major telecom routes, the first one 
stretched from China’s Nanning through Vietnam, from Hanoi in the north to Ho Chi Minh City 
in the south, with parts of the cable reaching Laos and Cambodia. The second route expanded 
from the Chinese city of Kunming to Vientiane in Laos and Bangkok in Thailand. The third one 
connected Dali in China with Yangon in Myanmar. Completion of this expensive and visible 
telecommunication infrastructure made China a reliable ally for these countries than either the 
European Union or the U.S.5 
The Chinese maritime military build-up is different from its concessive approach to 
economic matters. There have been new anxieties among littoral nations like the Philippines and 
Vietnam when China proclaimed the whole South China Sea to be an area of its “core concern.”6 
As China invested in a blue-water navy, it regarded maritime Asia as an open frontier and saw no 
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limit to project its power. 7  Since 2010, China has considered these maritime zones to be 
legitimate areas in which to flex its muscles, build garrisons on strategic islands, and consolidate 
air and naval strength against the U.S. The recent maritime sovereignty disputes have arisen due 
to a longstanding territorial conflict in which China proclaims to have sovereignty and control 
over its maritime peripheries, but Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the 
Philippines also claim to rule some of the resource-rich islands. In 2012, China started to prepare 
for conflicts on two maritime fronts: in the South China Sea with Vietnam over three island 
groups (i.e., the Spratlys, the Paracels, and Macclesfield Bank) and with the Philippines near the 
disputed Scarborough Shoal or Scarborough Reef (Huangyan Island), and in the East China Sea 
with Japan over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). China succeeded in using 
Cambodia and Laos to out-maneuverer the claimant countries of the ASEAN and to contain the 
Vietnamese and Philippine protests. This manipulative tactic was based on the premises that the 
U.S. had little clout to keep the ASEAN intact, and that the ASEAN lacked a political will to 
confront China.  
Keen to consolidate his own power, China’s new leader Xi Jinping dismissed any 
diplomatic initiatives that would weaken Chinese sovereignty claims over the disputed 
territories. China, in fact, has claimed more islands and waterways than it could actually possess 
under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In January 2013, Chinese coastguards set out 
to intercept and confiscate foreign ships entering the South China Sea, including islands claimed 
by Vietnam and the Philippines. Vietnam refused to back down because of domestic protests 
against territorial concessions with China.8 In the Philippines, Benigno Aquino, Jr., adopted a 
tougher stance on sovereignty issues than his predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who he 
condemned as appeasing Chinese aggression. In late 2013, China’s declaration of an air defence 
identification zone over disputed territories in the East China Sea added uncertainty to the 
situation and disrupted the balance of power in the western Pacific. When U.S. Vice President 
Joe Biden called on Xi Jinping to abandon the zone, China viewed the U.S. as an interloper to its 
sphere of influence and was determined to militarize the maritime frontier.  
Detecting the rising discontent over China’s power projection, the U.S. has not only 
clarified the status of the East and South China seas as being open transportation corridors for all 
nations, but has also urged Japan, South Korea and ASEAN to negotiate with China 
multilaterally, rather than through individual bargains that would only favour Beijing at the 
expense of weaker states such as the Philippines and Vietnam. To the U.S. and its allies, freedom 
of the seas is an important international principle that guarantees the freedom of navigation for 
vessels of all countries. Any nation’s attempt to make an open-ocean zone fall under its territorial 
sovereignty contradicts this legal principle and disrupts the global system. Washington backed its 
rhetoric with actions that included conducting joint military drills with Japan and the Philippines 
to deter potential Chinese attacks, and expanding mutual defence assistance with Japan and 
South Korea. The Obama administration deployed an advanced missile-defence system in Japan 
and permitted South Korea to launch long-range ballistic missiles. In preparation for widening its 
influence, the U.S. strengthened the military capacities of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Singapore, and connected the maritime disputes with its global anti-terrorist campaign 
against the Muslim rebels within these countries.9 While Washington has reassured the ASEAN 
of the U.S. presence vis-à-vis China, its response to a rising China seems moderate. The concern 
for stable Sino-American relations always takes precedence over the impulse to confrontation.  
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Out of fear of being marginalized, China condemned the ASEAN for siding with the U.S. 
In bullying Southeast Asia, it undercut decade-long diplomatic reassurances and confidence-
building efforts, and overplayed its hand in declaring the new air zone. Making other countries 
submissive is different from the art of winning trust and exercising leadership. Trust and 
leadership involves a sense of responsibility to uphold international rules and norms. China’s 
refusal to back down in the maritime territorial disputes reveals the remnants of Cold War 
thinking and insensitivity toward other nations’ desires for peace and stability. The costs of the 
Chinese offshore power projection have outweighed all the benefits, jeopardizing its relations 
with Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. In September 2012, Prime Minister Lee Hsien-
Loong of Singapore warned China not to dismiss the U.S. as a declining power, and urged 
Chinese leaders to resolve the sovereignty disputes through the ASEAN.10 
Worse still, there was little coordination among different Chinese ministerial agencies in 
handling maritime crises. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Liberation Army 
lacked adequate maritime knowledge and expertise. When the Ministry of Fisheries sent its huge 
surveillance boats to patrol the disputed territories, the Southeast Asian governments mistook 
these vessels as regular naval ships, threatening regional stability and risking an arms race. The 
absence of interagency coordination in maritime affairs made it difficult for Chinese leaders to 
assess the complexity of maritime disputes and to prevent them from escalating into diplomatic 
incidents. For example, China began sea trials in 2011 for its first aircraft carrier, a modified 
version of a Soviet vessel, and planned to build more carriers to patrol the East China and South 
China Seas. On July 25, 2012, China surprised the world by building a garrison of 1,200 soldiers 
and creating the Sansha municipality on a disputed island of 2.13 square kilometres (0.82 square 
miles) in the Paracels, known as Xisha in the Chinese official literature. China has utilized this 
offshore base to patrol major waterways claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, demonstrating 
its willingness to use force to defend the maritime frontier. But the tiny garrison is vulnerable to 
attacks by other nations because the closest Chinese territory is Hainan province, about 350 
kilometres (217.48 miles) away.  
These crises highlight a broader problem: no institutional mechanism exists under 
international law to deal with overlapping claims to maritime territories in Asia.11 The territorial 
disputes have sharpened the irreconcilable differences between China and neighbouring 
countries over the control of maritime space—especially groups of resource-rich islands—and 
the exercise of maritime jurisdiction related to actions taking place in international waters. 
Unless there is a multilateral framework to resolve conflicts among the claimant states, maritime 
rifts are likely to escalate, and the sovereignty disputes may prompt Japan and Southeast Asia to 
side with the U.S. against China.  
 
Bilateral Ties across the Taiwan Strait 
China’s declaration of a vast air defence identification zone in the East China Sea directly 
affected the Taiwan Strait theatre. If the declaration went unchallenged, this would be a green 
light for the creation of a zone over the South China Sea, which would threaten Taiwan’s 
security. As I argue elsewhere, the U.S. diplomatic cables, which were revealed by WikiLeaks, 
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showed joint efforts by China and the U.S. to prevent Taiwan, particularly under former 
president Chen Shui-bian during the period of 2000–2008, from drifting into independence.12 
When China recognized its failure to deal with Chen’s pro-independence stance through coercive 
diplomacy, it turned to the U.S. for help, undermining Chen’s referendum for the island’s 
admission into the United Nations. International observers have confirmed some informal 
cooperation between Beijing and Washington as neither side wants an independent Taiwan. 
China fears the effect that would have on its territorial integrity, and the U.S. does not want to 
risk its diplomatic relationship with China and possibly a war. The cables demonstrated a 
qualitative shift in U.S. strategy from using Taiwan to contain the rise of China towards 
stabilizing the triangular relationship and maintaining the balance of power across the Taiwan 
Strait. In the tangled political web, everything has shifted in China’s favour. While China used 
economic co-optation to restrict the pro-independence force, it deliberately marginalized the 
nation by stopping Taiwanese participation in international organizations and by targeting its few 
diplomatic allies.  
Despite diplomatic tensions, Taiwan’s economic ties with China have expanded since 
2000. Taiwan’s investment in China amounted to US$2.6 billion in 2000, representing 34% of 
the country’s outward investment. This figure rose to US$14.6 billion in 2010, around 84% of its 
outward investment. More Taiwanese enterprises found China an attractive destination for 
expansion. 40% of Taiwan’s exports went directly to China in 2011 compared to 26% in 2001, 
and Taiwanese exports to the U.S., Japan, and the European Union declined in the same decade. 
China has risen to be the second important trading nation for Taiwan.13 
Nonetheless, distrust remained between the top Chinese and Taiwanese leaders. The 
threat of the Chinese invasion still loomed over the Strait. To counter this threat, Taiwan needed 
to acquire military technology from the U.S. to modernize its defence system. In 2008, the 
US$6.5 billion arms sales package included Patriot anti-ballistic missiles, a retrofit for E-2T anti-
submarine aircraft, Apache helicopters, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Javelin anti-vehicle 
missiles. In 2010, the US$6.4 billion military package entailed sixty Black Hawk helicopters, 
114 Patriot anti-missile systems, twelve Harpoon missiles, two minesweepers, and a command 
and control enhancement system. These weapons strengthened the Taiwanese military in 
conventional warfare and symbolised the American commitment to defending the island.14  
Arms sales to Taiwan greatly affected the Sino-American and cross-Strait relations. 
China regarded the arms sales as a violation of its proclaimed sovereignty over Taiwan. Faced 
with the anger of Chinese nationalistic youth, who demanded economic and military sanctions 
against the U.S., Chinese Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotan criticised the arms sales as the greatest 
obstacle in Sino-American relations in June 2009.15 China, however, chose to prevent the arms 
sales from hurting its improved ties with Taiwan.  
The failure of China to stop the U.S. transfer of military technology to Taiwan made the 
one-China principle an illusion more than a reality, but Taiwan could never catch up with the 
fast-growing Chinese military. From 2001 to 2010, China increased military spending by 189%, 
an average annual increase of 12.5%. Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou stressed that under the 
Chinese threat, Taiwan should incorporate all elements of strategic power projection, including 
the build-up of conventional military defence and deterrence, the expansion of strategic ties with 
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the U.S., Japan and Southeast Asia, and the promotion of Taiwanese democratic values and 
practices among Mainland citizens.16  
As Taiwan drifts into a Chinese orbit, its politicians need to assess the pros and cons of 
being closely linked to Beijing. The Taiwan issue still remains at the heart of Sino-American 
relations. Perceiving China as a competitor, U.S. President Barack Obama’s pivot toward the 
Pacific after years of anti-terrorism efforts in Central Asia and the Middle East is significant. Not 
only does it make Taiwan an important bargaining chip in negotiations with China, but it also 
offers the nation the autonomy to establish its own agenda. 
 
Domestic Discontents and Governance Crises  
 China’s ability to balance against the U.S. in maritime Asia is contingent upon many 
circumstantial factors. Over the last decade, China’s leaders favoured pragmatism over ideology, 
and called for consensus-building and multilateralism in dispute resolution. They opened 
themselves to negotiate and compromise with any government. Before Aung San Suu Kyi was 
freed from house arrest in November 2010, Chinese officials met with Burmese opposition 
leaders in Beijing for talks on future collaboration. Shortly after Arab Spring swept through the 
Middle East and North Africa, China negotiated with revolutionary leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria for deepening economic ties. Aware of the vulnerability of its overseas strategic 
interests and investments in the event of a collapse of the government, China has worked to 
balance the interests of all factions. As with his predecessors, Xi Jinping continues to exploit 
foreign affairs to foster internal stability and economic development, but he has yet to overcome 
four institutional limitations. These obstacles are exacerbated by several explosive factors such 
as a lack of prosperity, high inflation and unemployment rates, rampant corruption, and 
incompetent government that is devoid of democratic legitimacy. 
First, China’s rise to power is not peaceful at all. Its pursuit of strategic security is fraught 
with paradoxes, and has destabilized domestic politics. As Beijing failed to resolve maritime 
sovereignty disputes with neighbours through negotiation, many netizens organized protests to 
express their nationalist sentiments and destroyed foreign factories in China. The waves of 
nationalism have swept across the country with the public outcry for sanctions against foreign 
countries and the hostile remarks by commanders of the People’s Liberation Army. The 
widespread “China can say No” attitude has prevented the Chinese leaders from embracing new 
diplomatic initiatives to solve the disputes.  
Second, hostility towards liberal intellectuals, critical journalists, and ethnic minorities 
continues in present-day China. Imprisonment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, 
persecution of Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims, and forced exile of dissidents show that 
the state has tightened its grip upon the citizenry despite its rhetoric of tolerance and compassion. 
In Chongqing municipality, Bo Xilai, son of revolutionary hero Bo Yibo, gained much attention 
employing Maoist rhetoric and state-sponsored welfare projects for political gain. In Beijing, 
Zhou Yongkang, who controlled the national public security forces, was purged in Xi Jinping’s 
anti-corruption campaigns. With the downfall of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the Communist 
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leadership has demonstrated its awkwardness in resolving the contradictions of both Maoist past 
and reformist present. Displays of assertiveness and confidence occur, moreover, with rising 
discontents that inhibit real self-assertiveness. Since the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese leaders 
have recognized the need to transform its export-led economy into one driven by domestic 
consumption. Nevertheless, the dramatic political crises in the wake of the fall of Bo Xilai and 
Zhou Yongkang, the leadership succession, and the anti-corruption campaigns in 2014 
discouraged any ambitious leaders from addressing these structural problems and experimenting 
liberal reforms. 
Third, the reality of an economic slowdown in China suggests that while state-led 
capitalism has run its course, the Chinese Communist Party cannot appeal to its neighbours with 
material incentives. China today has to confront many negative attributes of globalization. 
Unprecedented growth gave China a temporary reprieve but the national economy has slowed 
down and the state has yet to offer a sustainable developmental strategy. According to Carl E. 
Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, the state refused to transfer power to entrepreneurs and financial 
professionals, while ruling elites mainly used state-run commercial banks to drive growth that 
covered up nonperforming debts and distorted the value of bank assets.17 Whereas sustainable 
growth required China’s consumers to buy more local products, urging a massive transfer of 
wealth to the citizenry in order to do so, the state did the opposite by increasing spending on 
fixed investment. The injection of stimulus money into state-owned enterprises and large 
infrastructure projects was not sustainable. Since late 2011, many private enterprises have been 
bankrupt because they lacked the connections to secure bank loans that could resolve their cash 
flow problems. Whether or not China postpones a crisis for the time being, the days of being 
perceived as the world’s economic miracle are numbered.  
Finally, market liberalization is a double-edged sword. The rapidity with which the state 
has achieved growth has created tensions and conflicts at all levels. Extremely efficient and 
highly urban, China’s development has yielded growth rates above those of most developed 
nations. But its new wealth is unevenly distributed, its labour market ruthless, and its living 
environment Dickensian. Because of popular grievances caused by the state’s aggressive 
development strategies and reluctance to liberalize its authoritarian system, a rising China that 
denies its citizens what they desire—such as job security, healthcare, gender equality and 
freedom—drives discontented sections of society to mobilize for collective action in order to 
guarantee security, solace and justice. Popular protest has become a prominent mode of political 
participation, and the dangers of ineffective governance are reflected internally. As many as 
180,000 strikes, demonstrations and protests were reported in 2010. This is an average of 493 
incidents per day. This official figure indicates a dramatic increase from the 90,000 incidents 
documented in 2006 and fewer than 9,000 in the mid-1990s.18 The fear of domestic instability 
may prompt the top leadership to concentrate on stability maintenance rather than external power 
projection.  
 
Conclusion 
9 
 
The latest maritime sovereignty disputes and the cross-Strait ties clearly revealed a 
qualitative shift in China’s strategy from forging alliance with neighbours to competing with the 
U.S. But China shared fewer strategic interests with Southeast Asia and failed to limit the U.S. 
influence in the Pacific waters. Throughout the disputes, the U.S. pressurized China to negotiate 
with Southeast Asia, Japan, and Taiwan. If China wants to retain some room for manoeuvre, it 
must devise a viable mechanism for resolving maritime conflicts and engaging with Taiwan. 
Faced with the concern about China’s threat to regional stability, Beijing expressed no intention 
to challenge the U.S.-dominated international system, but this rhetoric has little appeal among 
regional governments.  
In a nutshell, China does not need to follow the logic of a zero-sum game in its 
encounters with neighbouring states. Its gain should not lead to another country’s loss. To build 
trust and confidence with the global community, China should recognize the East and South 
China seas as international transportation corridors for all countries, and formulate innovative 
mechanisms for dispute resolution. Otherwise, it will miss the opportunity to set the course of 
action for the future and find itself caught in serious diplomatic rifts. 
10 
 
Bibliography 
Bhattacharya, Pinaki. 2011. “Back to the Future: Changes among Chinese Mandarins.” World 
Focus, no.383–384: 855–860. 
Chen, Dingding and Jianwei Wang. 2011. “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the 
Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy.” China: An International Journal 9, no.2: 195–216. 
Clayton, Marquis. August 24, 2012. “Uncomfortable Truths: Breaking the Impasse in the South 
China Sea.” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no.178. Accessed on August 24, 2012, 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb178_0.pdf. 
Ferguson, Niall. 2012. “The Interview: Niall Ferguson.” The World Today 68, no.1: 16–18. 
Glassman, Jim. 2007. “Imperialism Imposed and Invited: The ‘War on Terror’ Comes to 
Southeast Asia.” In Derek Gregory and Allan Pred (eds.), Violent Geographies: Fear, 
Terror, and Political Violence. New York: Routledge, pp.93–109.  
Huang, Christopher Y., and Joseph Tse-Hei Lee. 2013. “Entangled Web: The Wikileaks and 
U.S.-China Rivalries over Taiwan.” International Journal of China Studies 4, no.3: 285–300. 
Jacques, Martin. 2012. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the 
Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Penguin. 
Lee, Joseph Tse-Hei and Lida V. Nedilsky. 2012. “Appeal and Discontent: The Yin and Yang of 
China’s Rise to Power.” In Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, and Siu-Keung Cheung 
(eds.), China’s Rise to Power: Conceptions of State Governance. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp.1–30. 
Liu, Sidney Y. 2012. “Harmonious Online Society: The China Model in the Information Age.” 
In Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, and Siu-Keung Cheung (eds.), China’s Rise to 
Power: Conceptions of State Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.91–110. 
Mark, Chi-Kwan. 2012. China and the World since 1945: An International History. New York: 
Routledge. 
Odgaard, Liselotte. 2002. Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.  
Perlez, Jane. September 7, 2012. “Singaporean Tells China U.S. Is Not in Decline.” The New 
York Times, A12. 
Walter, Carl E. and Fraser T. J. Howie. 2011. Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation 
of China’s Extraordinary Rise. Singapore: John Wiley and Sons.  
11 
 
Wang, Jianwei. 2010. “United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations.” Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 15, no.4: 351–369. 
Wang, Zheng. 2014. “The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context.” Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 19, no.1: 1–13. 
 
  
12 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang. “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao 
Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: An International Journal 9, no.2 (2011): 195–216. 
2
 Niall Ferguson, “The Interview: Niall Ferguson,” The World Today 68, no.1: 16–18. 
3
 Chi-Kwan Mark, China and the World since 1945: An International History (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), pp.124–126. 
4
 Zheng Wang, “The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context,” Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 19, no.1 (2014): 1–13. 
5
 Sidney Y. Liu, “Harmonious Online Society: The China Model in the Information Age,” in 
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, and Siu-Keung Cheung (eds.), China’s Rise to Power: 
Conceptions of State Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.91–110. 
6
 Pinaki Bhattacharya, “Back to the Future: Changes among Chinese Mandarins,” World Focus, 
no.383–384 (2011): 855–860. 
7
 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a 
New Global Order (New York: Penguin, 2012), p.374. 
8
 Marquis Clayton, “Uncomfortable Truths: Breaking the Impasse in the South China Sea,” Asia 
Pacific Bulletin, no.178 (August 24, 2012). Accessed on August 24, 2012, 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb178_0.pdf 
9
 Jim Glassman, “Imperialism Imposed and Invited: The ‘War on Terror’ Comes to Southeast 
Asia,” in Derek Gregory and Allan Pred (eds.), Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political 
Violence (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.93–109.  
10
 Jane Perlez, “Singaporean Tells China U.S. Is Not in Decline,” The New York Times 
(September 7, 2012), p.A12. 
13 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11
 Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002), pp.59–106. 
12
 Christopher Y. Huang and Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, “Entangled Web: The Wikileaks and U.S.-
China Rivalries over Taiwan,” International Journal of China Studies 4, no.3 (2013): 285–300. 
13
 Ibid., pp.291–292. 
14
 Ibid., pp.293–294. 
15
 Jianwei Wang, “United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 15, no.4 (2010), p.364. 
16
 Huang and Lee, “Entangled Web,” pp.294–295. 
17
 Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of 
China’s Extraordinary Rise (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2011).  
18
 Joseph Tse-Hei Lee and Lida V. Nedilsky, “Appeal and Discontent: The Yin and Yang of 
China’s Rise to Power,” in Lee, Nedilsky, and Cheung (eds.), China’s Rise to Power, p.20. 
